Islamist Movement Trapped by Armed Empowerment
Dissolved National Congress survives through repression, not popular legitimacy
Islamist Movement Trapped by Armed Empowerment – Dissolved National Congress survives through repression, not popular legitimacy – Khartoum Highlight
The dissolved National Congress Party remains captive to a military mindset, relying on repression instead of public legitimacy. It clings to security tools, believing guns can replace ballot boxes, and fear can replace popular trust. This mentality led it to isolation, aligning with coercive institutions instead of competing in open political space. But this choice came at a cost.
The party tied itself to temporary military alliances that brought double confrontation. It faces a society rejecting guardianship and dictatorship, and a future rejecting closed structures hostile to democracy. Reliance on armed force may extend the party’s life, but it remains fragile, isolated, and forgotten. Its real battle is no longer against rivals, but against time itself.
Will it break free from military grip and join society, or remain trapped in the cage of hard power? The weapon cannot build a nation, and repression breeds only collapse. At Sudan’s political crossroads, one core question arises: why does the National Congress hold militias and armed formations?
From “Wa A’idu” to “Ud’u”
Babiker Faisal, head of the Federal Gathering and expert on Islamist groups, explains this issue is rooted in Brotherhood ideology. He says Hassan al-Banna proposed preparing 300 battalions, trained spiritually, psychologically, and militarily to seize power. This line continued with Sayyid Qutb, then Hassan al-Turabi, who planted cells in Sudan’s army after 1977 reconciliation. Since then, Islamists tied themselves organically to military power, making it a political creed. Faisal adds: “After thirty years of authoritarianism, militias became their weapon against change.” He notes they staged the coup against the transitional authority and ignited the devastating April 15 war. According to Faisal, the party must undergo a deep transformation to abandon militias. He calls for replacing the sword emblem and the slogan “Wa A’idu” with “Ud’u,” symbolizing strength of logic and argument.
Crisis of Trust in Democracy
Kamal Omar, senior figure in the Popular Congress, offers a different but converging view. He says the National Congress ran the country with security methods since seizing power. It never had a political program rooted in people’s will. “All their experiences were fraud, even electing mosque imams,” Omar says. He argues the party lacked self-trust and democratic reference, so it relied on military bodies until its fall. Ironically, these same military bodies eventually caused its downfall. Omar adds the party still seeks revival through the military and security, but has no popular support left. Especially after the current war, it has become a purely military mentality doomed to fail politically.
Battalions of Violence
Since the latest war, Islamist battalions resurfaced under names like Shadow Battalions and al-Baraa ibn Malik. Dozens of videos showed shocking acts: killings, executions, and civilians’ abdomens ripped open. They particularly targeted December Revolution activists, resistance committees, and emergency rooms. Their message was clear: “Your revolution achieved nothing.” A leader of al-Baraa ibn Malik, Mohammed Abbas, mocked revolutionary murals and slogans, signaling Islamists’ return. Such actions echoed threats by ousted regime leaders. Ali Osman Taha once warned: “We have shadow battalions you know well.” The reappearance of al-Baraa battalions led by Musbah Talha confirmed his words.
International Concern and the Quartet
Islamist militarization also alarmed international actors. United States sanctioned al-Baraa battalions. Quartet (US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE) stressed removing extremist groups tied to the Brotherhood from Sudan’s future. National Congress and its allies remain trapped in “armed empowerment,” despite history proving its failure. Like previous regimes of Nimeiri and Bashir, their fate appears sealed. Especially with sharp public division and loss of social base, their political survival is unlikely.
The key question remains: can Sudanese Islamists abandon the “creed of weapons”? Can they return to politics through logic and ideas? Or will they remain hostage to militias, sealing their own end as past military regimes did? Judging by their rhetoric and armed acts, the answer leans toward the latter. But as the December Revolution showed, Sudanese streets can surprise. Perhaps people will once again write with blood the final chapter for this destructive mindset.
